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 1 
PART ONE 
Introduction 
 
The enthusiastic expectations of the early 1990s about the emergence and likely consolidation of democracy 
across the former Soviet Union, as well as about the successful integration of Russia into the Western 
community of democratic states, have been dissolved by a combination of Western, especially U.S., 
triumphalism and the realities of Russian political culture and the resulting authoritarian political system that 
has emerged in Russia. Dmitry Trenin and other analysts
1
 have correctly noted that throughout the 1990s 
Russian interests were downplayed, or simply ignored, by Washington and Brussels, largely on the assumption 
that Russia was, in fact, finished as a great power and did not have to be taken into account when they were 
making important foreign policy and security decisions. As the United States pushed through its policy 
preferences in a broad range of areas—the restructuring and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), military intervention in former Yugoslavia, a unilateral and assertive response to the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the resulting invasion and occupation of Iraq and policy toward the 
broader Middle East, the emplacement of a missile defense system in Central Europe, attempts to limit Russian 
influence on the development and distribution of natural gas resources from Central Asia, etc.—Moscow’s 
interests and concerns were simply left out of the policy calculations or, if raised, they were quickly brushed 
aside as irrelevant or hostile.
2
  
Throughout the 1990s Russian leaders often voiced their strong objections to U.S. initiatives, as when 
President Boris Yeltsin stormed out of a meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) on Chechnya in 1999, but generally were in no position to do anything more than complain, then 
eventually to acquiesce to those initiatives—such as NATO expansion in Central Europe in 1998 or the NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia during the 1999 confrontation over Kosovo. As a result Russian-U.S. relations visibly 
deteriorated throughout the 1990s and reached the point in early 2001—little more than a year into the 
administration of President Vladimir Putin and almost immediately following George W. Bush’s takeover of the 
White House—of mutual diplomatic expulsions and recriminations.
3
 Throughout the 1990s the specific issues 
that increasingly divided Moscow and Washington, after the very brief period of Russia’s virtually identifying 
its policy with that of the United States, concerned a growing series of issues that continue to divide the two 
countries today. They began with NATO expansion and the more general incorporation of former Soviet 
dependencies and even constituent republics—from Bulgaria to Estonia, with Ukraine and Georgia as future 
targets—into what Moscow views as a U.S.-dominated political and security sphere, and included NATO 
                                                           
1
 See, for example, Dmitri V. Trenin, (2007) Getting Russia Right. Washington: Carnegie Endowment; and Vladimir 
Rukavishnikov, (2007) ‘Choices for Russia: Preserving Inherited Geopolitics through Emergent Global and European 
Realities,’ in Roger E. Kanet, ed., Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 54-78. 
2
 For example, Senator Jesse Helms, then the powerful chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was especially 
outspoken in dismissing the relevance of Russian concerns. In introductory remarks before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations he dismissed Russian objections to possible US changes in the ABM Treaty by noting that the hearings would 
proceed from the presumption that the ABM Treaty had ceased to exist and that attempts to revise it would be defeated. See 
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (1999) Ballistic Missiles: Threat and Response: Hearings Before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session April 15 and 20, May 4, 5, 
25, 26, and September 16, 1999. Washington: Government Printing Office. See also Jesse Helms, Senator (1999) ‘Amend 
the ABM Treaty? No, Scrap It,’ The Wall Street Journal, 22 January, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/. See also Andrei P. 
Tsykankov (2006) Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield.  
3
 The author has dealt with the evolving nature of Russian-U.S. relations in several earlier publications. See, for example, 
Roger E. Kanet and Nuray Ibryamova (2001) ‘Verpaßte Gelegenheiten? Amerikanisch-Russische Beziehungen in den 90er 
Jahren,’ Osteuropa, 51, 8, 985-1001; Roger E. Kanet (2001) ‘Zwischen Konsens und Konfrontation: Rußland und die 
Vereinigten Staaten,’ 51, 4/5, 509-521; Roger E. Kanet and Nouray V. Ibryamova (2002) ‘La sécurité en Europe centrale et 
orientale: un système en cours de changement,’ Revue d’Études comparatives Est-Ouest, 33/1, 179-203; Gabriela Marin 
Thornton and Roger E. Kanet (2005) ‘The Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States,’ in Roger E. 
Kanet, ed., The New Security Environment: The Impact on Russia, Central and Eastern Europe. Aldershot, UK/Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 165-182; and Roger E. Kanet and Larisa Homarac (2007) ‘The U.S. Challenge to Russian 
Influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus,’ in Kanet, ed., Russia: Re-Emerging Great Power, pp. 173-194. 
2 Roger E. Kanet 
 
intervention in former Yugoslavia, criticism of Russian domestic political developments, and a series of other 
events. After a brief attempt to reestablish a collaborative relationship on the basis of equality after the terrorist 
attacks in the United States of September 2001 and after the beginnings of the turnaround in the Russian 
economy, President Putin seemingly decided that Russia should ‘go it alone,’ that continued efforts to gain 
acceptance as an equal participant in the various ‘Western clubs’ would fail and that Moscow would always be 
treated by the West as an outsider. Russia simply had to pursue its own political agenda, regardless of the 
reactions of Washington or Brussels. Moreover, Putin’s plans for reasserting central control across the length of 
Russia did not mesh well with Russia’s stated commitment to democratization. The concept of ‘sovereign 
democracy,’ first used in 2005 by Vladislav Surkov, Russia’s Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, 
quickly emerged as a theoretical explanation and justification of Russia’s independent, even unilateralist, 
approach to foreign and security policy, as well as the top-down approach to domestic political control. By the 
December 2007 Parliamentary elections, ‘sovereign democracy’ had become part of the political program of 
United Russia, Russia’s governing party now headed by President Putin himself.
4
  
One major result of the Russian leadership’s redefinition of Russia’s role in world affairs during the past 
decade has been Russia’s emergence as a revisionist power—one committed to rolling back many of the 
geopolitical changes that occurred after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and to returning Russia to the 
status of a major world power. This involves, first and foremost, Moscow’s reasserting its position as the 
dominant actor in former Soviet space, in the areas along its periphery that it views as areas of Russia’s 
‘privileged interests,’ as President Dmitry Medvedev put it in an interview soon after Russia’s military 
intervention in Georgia in August 2008.
5
 Closely related to the reassertion of Russian influence in immediate 
border areas, however, has been the commitment to challenging the global dominance—or attempted 
dominance—of the United States.
6
 Thus, since the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, Moscow has increasingly and 
loudly criticized virtually all aspects of U.S. policy—foreign and domestic—and has gone out of its way to 
collaborate, at least rhetorically and symbolically, with states that share Russia’s opposition to U.S. 
unilateralism, such as Venezuela and Cuba.
7
 
The objective of the present essay is to track recent Russian relations with the United States—focusing on 
the period between the U.S. intervention in Iraq in spring 2003 until the end of 2008—to support the argument 
that Russian leaders have decided to pursue a policy of independence, even confrontation, in their relations with 
the United States, as well as with Europe, as an integral part of a new assertive approach to achieving policy 
objectives. As noted above, Russian relations with the United States had gradually deteriorated during the 
1990s, as Russia’s leadership recognized that the policies introduced at the outset by President Yeltsin and his 
first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, were simply idealistic and unworkable. They assumed that Russian 
interests coincided with those of the West, including the United States, and that the West would provide the 
type of financial support that would rapidly rebuild the collapsed Russian economy. Even before President 
Yeltsin replaced Kozyrev with Yevgenii Primakov as foreign minister in the run-up to the 1996 presidential 
election, Russian policy had begun to shift from its strong pro-Western orientation to an approach that was 
much more critical of the West and focused on what were viewed as Russia’s immediate interests—e.g., the 
status of ethnic Russians in what was then termed ‘the Near Abroad,’ the reestablishment of relations with long-
                                                           
4
 Graeme Herd (2009, forthcoming) provides an extensive discussion of the concept ‘sovereign democracy’ in ‘Russia’s 
Sovereign Democracy: Instrumentalization, Interests and Identity,’ in Roger E. Kanet, ed., (in press) A Resurgent Russia and 
the European Union. Dordrecht: ROL Publishing. For a discussion of the concept of identity as it impacts Russian foreign 
policy see Andrei Tsygankov (2008) ‘Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian 
Civilizational Debates,’ International Studies Review 10/4, 786-94.  
5
 Dmitry Medvedev (2008) ‘Medvedev Sets Out Five Foreign Policy Principles in TV Interview,’ Vesti TV, 31 August; BBC 
Monitoring, translated in Johnson’s Russia List, JRL 2008-163, 2 September. For the most comprehensive recent treatment 
of recent Russian policy toward other former Soviet republics see Bertil Nygren (2007) The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: 
Putin’s Foreign Policy Toward the CIS Countries. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
6
 For the argument that the United States is not, nor can it be, a global superpower because of the limitations of its 
capabilities and the rise of political competitors, see Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet, eds. (2008), From 
Superpower to Besieged Global Power: Restoring World Order after the Failure of the Bush Doctrine. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, esp. chs. 1, 15. 
7
 For an extensive discussion of recent Russian criticisms of the United States and the West in general see Vladimir 
Shlapentokh (2008) ‘Behind the Five-Day War: The Ideological Backing of Putin’s Regime,’ Johnson’s Russia List, JRL 
2008-195, 23 October. See also Clifford J. Levy (2008) ‘Russia Adopts Blustery Tone Set by Envoy,’ The New York Times, 
28 August, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/world/europe/28moscow.html?hp=&pagewanted=print. 
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time Soviet allies, and resistance to what were viewed as Western attempts to take advantage of temporary 
Russian weakness to gain advantages in the areas of Central and Eastern Europe that had broken free of Russian 
domination a few short years earlier. 
The following discussion of Russian-U.S. relations is divided into four sections: the first outlines the 
deteriorating relationship in the final years of Yeltsin’s presidency; the second treats the revival of Russia as a 
major power under Putin and Medvedev; the next examines in some detail the impact of that revival on Russian 
relations with the United States; and the fourth and final section outlines possible future scenarios for the 
relationship. 
 

 5 
PART TWO 
The End of the Yeltsin Era 
 
President Yeltsin’s appointment of Yevgenii Primakov as foreign minister in 1996 did not really usher in a new 
era in Russian foreign policy, although Primakov emphasized more than had his predecessor the fact that Russia 
had been and remained a great power, despite its current economic and political problems, and that its foreign 
policy should be based on this reality. He argued that Russia would not accept dependence on outside powers 
and was committed to the creation of a stable multipolar world in which Russia’s relations with the United 
States would be based on an ‘equal partnership.’
8
 Despite the fact that Kozyrev had emphasized the importance 
of Russia’s ties to the West, even while increasingly pursuing Russia’s interests elsewhere, Primakov justified 
Russia’s policies in pragmatic terms of Russian national interest, not theoretical ties to the democratic West. 
This meant, for example, a focus on Russia’s primacy in security and political developments within the territory 
of the former Soviet Union—a point that is central in current Russian policy a decade later.   
The Russians increasingly opposed U.S.-initiated United Nations economic sanctions against a number of 
countries—all viewed as important potential international partners for Russia. At the time of U.S. and British 
military air strikes in Iraq in retaliation for repeated Iraqi refusals to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors in 
late 1998, President Yeltsin spoke of ‘gross violations of the UN Charter.’ When the West began to bring 
pressure on Yugoslavia in 1998 over the issue of Kosovo, the Russians placed Yugoslav territorial integrity far 
above the issue of human rights and threatened various forms of retaliation if the West bombed Yugoslavia. 
The issue that raised the most serious Russian concerns at this time—an issue that is even more important a 
decade later
9
—was NATO’s decision to proceed with eastward expansion into former Soviet-controlled Europe. 
Moscow’s multifaceted campaign against the extension of membership to Central European states prior to the 
Madrid meetings of NATO in July 1997 included pressure on the applicant countries and threats that the 
expansion would in effect initiate a new cold war in relations between Russia and the West. However, when 
NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the alliance, Russia reluctantly accepted the 
decision without any of the retaliatory responses that had been threatened. Once it became obvious that their 
efforts to forestall the expansion of NATO eastward were doomed to failure, the Russians seem to have 
accepted reality and attempted to gain whatever benefits they could out of that acceptance. They shifted their 
opposition to NATO expansion from East Central Europe to the Baltic states—but also failed to stop the 
inclusion of those states seven years later. The push in Washington in 2008 to extend NATO membership to 
Georgia and Ukraine no doubt was important in triggering the much more aggressive Russian response. The key 
difference from the earlier periods in explaining Moscow’s reaction was the much stronger economic and even 
military position from which it was operating in 2008 and the significant shift in Russia’s policy orientation 
under Putin. 
Although NATO and Russia signed the Russian-NATO Founding Act in May 1997 that was to provide a 
clear framework for Russian-NATO relations, and Russia was granted membership in an expanded ‘G-8’, in 
fact neither of these relationships fulfilled Russian objectives. The Russia-NATO Founding Act failed to serve 
as an effective means for Russia to pursue its foreign policy interests. While the Act did not provide Russia with 
anything approximating veto power over NATO decisions, it did call for consultation on important security 
issues. In fact, NATO largely ignored Russia’s increasingly vehement complaints about its refusal to consult on 
issues ranging from the former’s attempts to arrest Serbs as war criminals and to implement various aspects of 
the Dayton peace accords. At the same time, Moscow was excluded from full participation in those ‘G-8’ 
meetings at which meaningful decisions concerning international financial matters were likely to occur. But, 
                                                           
8
 Evgenyi Primakov (1998) ‘Rossiia ishchet novoe mesto v mire,’ (interview with E. Primkov), Izvestiia, 6 March 1996; 
Dmitrii Gornostaev (1998) ‘Novoe v staroi kontseptsii Primakova,’ Nezavisimaia gazeta, 17 March. 
9
 In a nationally televised interview in August 2008 President Medvedev stated: ‘We do not need illusions of partnership. 
When we are being surrounded by bases on all sides, and a growing number of states are being drawn into the North 
Atlantic bloc and we are being told, ‘Don’t worry, everything is all right,’ naturally we do not like it.’ Cited in Levy, ‘Russia 
Adopts Blustery Tone.’ 
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given the disastrous state of its economy, Moscow had little hope of exercising any real influence within the 
group.    
In the attempt to diversify their foreign relations in the late 1990s the Russians pursued policies aimed at 
strengthening ties with a number of countries throughout Asia—several of which had been important clients of 
the former USSR. This occurred despite strong and repeated opposition from the United States. Central to this 
effort was the ‘strategic partnership’ with China, whose leaders shared Russia’s growing concerns about U.S. 
unilateralism and global dominance. A number of high-level meetings between the two countries during 1997 
and 1998 raised the issue of the threat of U.S. global hegemony and condemned NATO expansion, as well as 
the growing pressure that NATO was bringing against Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, Moscow strengthened 
relations with Iran and rebuilt relations with India, both of which along with China represented important 
markets for Russian military and nuclear technology.
10
 These initiatives, which had the dual objective of 
generating additional exports and strengthening Russia’s position as an independent world power, brought 
Russia almost immediately into direct conflict with U.S. policy objectives. At this time the United States 
opposed the sale of advanced military equipment to India, because of its potential destabilizing effect on the 
regional military balance, and the delivery of nuclear technology to Iran, which it viewed as a ‘rogue’ state that 
was likely to challenge regional security, as well as the long-term interests of the West.
11
   
When President Boris Yeltsin plucked Vladimir Putin from political obscurity in August 1999 and began to 
groom him as his successor, the state of Russia’s relations with the United States had reached a post-cold war 
low. However, even though Russia pursued policies that were in direct conflict with U.S. foreign policy 
objectives, the central component of bilateral Russian relations with the United States remained stable. 
Moreover, given its generally weak position because of its economic dependence on the West, Moscow often 
was forced to back down when faced with U.S. opposition. As should be clear, most of the issues that divide 
Russian-American relations in early 2009 have their roots in political and security developments a decade 
earlier. What has changed is the unwillingness of Moscow to accept a position of weakness or dependence in 
their relations with the West. It is important to recall that throughout the prior decade the United States, and the 
West more generally, had benefited geopolitically from the weakness of the Russian Federation. From 
Moscow’s perspective, they were encroaching on Russia’s legitimate sphere of influence and, in effect, 
pursuing policies that de facto were designed to contain future Russian influence. 
 
                                                           
10
 On Russian policy in Asia in the late 1990s see Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, eds. (1999) 
Russia and East Asia: the 21st Century Security Environment. Armonk, NY/London: M.E. Sharpe for East/West Institute, 
New York. See, also, Peter Truscott (1997) Russia First: Breaking with the West. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 54-58; and 
Jerome M. Conley (2001) Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for U.S. Policy in South 
Asia. Lanham, MD/New York/Oxford, England: Lexington Books. Negotiations with China resulted in 2001 in the creation 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which provides an important forum for the two states to coordinate their foreign 
and security policies with those of the countries of Central Asia.  
11
 A decade later disagreements concerning the development of Iran’s nuclear program remain central to the differences 
between Moscow and Washington. 
 7 
PART THREE 
Putin, Medvedev and the Rebuilding of Russia as a Major Power 
 
Early in his presidency Vladimir Putin made clear his commitment to reestablishing Russia’s position as the 
preeminent regional power and important international actor. Essential preconditions for the fulfillment of these 
objectives, as described in the ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ that he approved, were the internal political stability 
and economic viability of Russia.
12
 Russia had to overcome all evidence of and inclinations toward separatism, 
national and religious extremism, and terrorism. Putin moved forcefully and, in most cases effectively, in 
reasserting central governmental control in Russia. The economy, while still not flourishing, had shown strong 
signs of turning around with growth rates of 4.5, 10.0, and 5.0 percent in the years 1999-2001.
13
 High growth 
rates continued, and even expanded in the following years—not merely in the oil and gas sector, but across 
broad sectors of the economy.
14
 These political and economic gains, however, occurred along with growing 
disregard for the civil liberties and democratic processes to which Putin’s government was nominally 
committed. His anti-corruption campaign, for example, soon become a catch-all that targeted those who in any 
way challenged his policies or were concerned about the authoritarian turn in Russian politics—such as those 
associated with the independent national media, which was basically silenced by the end of Putin’s second term 
as President. 
In the foreign policy realm Russia under Putin continued to seek allies who shared its commitment to 
preventing the global dominance of the United States that represents, in the words of the ‘Foreign Policy 
Concept,’ a threat to international security and to Russia’s goal of serving as a major center of influence in a 
multipolar world. Most of the issues on which Russia and the United States disagreed already in the mid-1990s 
continued to plague that relationship.  In other words, until the terrorist attacks on the United States in 
September 2001 there was little evidence that the disagreements dividing Russia and the United States during 
the 1990s would disappear soon—in particular since they derived from core elements of their respective foreign 
policy commitments. In fact, after a very brief hiatus immediately following 9/11, those issues reemerged and 
continue to undermine Russian-U.S. relations in 2009.   
However, Putin’s success in dealing with the major domestic problems challenging the Russian state meant 
that Russia increasingly faced Europe and the United States from a position of increased stability and strength. 
Putin’s reassertion of central control over the territory of the Russian Federation—by eliminating the election of 
provincial governors, by suppressing domestic opponents and critics (especially the independent media) and by 
playing on the fears of Russian citizens of domestic terrorism, crime, and general chaos—played an important 
role in strengthening the Russian state, which under his predecessor at times seemed on the verge of collapsing. 
Besides rebuilding the foundations of the Russian state at great cost to political liberty and democracy as a 
precondition for Russia’s ability to reassert itself as a major power, Putin and his associates benefited greatly 
from the exponential rise in global demand for gas and oil—at least until the global economic collapse of fall 
2008—and the ensuing revitalization of the Russian economy. This, in turn, has contributed to Russia’s ability 
to pursue a much more active and assertive foreign policy, as many analysts have noted.
15
 What the longer term 
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 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2000) Approved by the President of the Russian Federation V. 
Putin, 28 June, http://www.mid.ru/mid/eng/econcept.htm; also available in Johnson’s Russia List, JRL 2000-#4403, 14. July 
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 Central Bank (2001) ‘Main Macroeconomic Indicators,’ Central Bank of the Russian Federation, http://www.cbr.ru/eng/ 
statistics/credit_statistics/ 
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 Russian Economic Report, no. 16. The World Bank in Russia, June 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
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15
 However, as some analysts have argued, the revived role of Russia as a regional and global political actor is based 
extensively on oil and gas production and exports, despite recent improvements in other aspects of the Russian economy. 
See, for example, Kathleen J. Hancock (2007) ‘Russia: Great Power Image versus Economic Reality,’ Asian Perspective, 
31, 4, 71-98; Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (2008) ‘The Myth of Putin’s Success,’ Foreign Affairs, 87, 1: 68-
84; and Rajan Menon and Alexander J. Motyl (2007) ‘The Myth of Russian Resurgence,’ The American Interest.Online, 2, 
4, 96-101, http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=258&MId=8. 
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impact of the collapse of the global economy since fall 2008 and the dramatic drop in energy prices will have on 
the Russian economy and on Russia’s ability to pursue an assertive foreign policy is yet to be seen.  
Thus, Putin was quite successful, and fortunate, during the eight years of his presidency in establishing the 
economic and political foundations for a strong centralized state as the prerequisite for Russia’s reasserting 
itself as a major player in international political and security affairs. While the voices calling for Russia to 
resume its role as a great, global power in the 1990s were strident but not realistic, similar voices have today 
taken over the dominant position in Russian politics and are based upon realistic expectations of achieving 
many of their goals. Supporters of this policy position begin with former President Putin himself, as made clear 
in his statement to the Russian parliament and people that ‘the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest 
geopolitical catastrophe of the century.’
16
 This comment was followed early in 2007 by Putin’s broad attack on 
virtually all aspects of U.S. policy delivered at an international security conference in Munich that made clear 
Russia’s new assertive and nationalistic approach to foreign policy, beginning with its relations with the United 
States.
17
 As Mark Beissinger notes, Putin’s comments imply that the ‘persistence of the Soviet empire would 
have been preferable to the East European democracies or to the current fifteen states that now cover former 
Soviet space.’
18
 The rhetoric emanating from Moscow since the military incursion into Georgia, in particular 
that of President Medvedev, confirmed the image of a revisionist state intent upon reestablishing its dominant 
role, at least along its periphery, and one that simply will no longer deal with the rest of the world on any other 
terms except those that it sets.
19
 
By May 2008, when Putin turned the presidency over to his successor Dmitry Medvedev, Russia had 
reemerged as a major player in European economic and political affairs and the dominant actor in most of post-
Soviet space. The foundation of this new role has been Russia’s semi-monopoly over the extraction and 
distribution of natural gas and oil across much of Eurasia, and the growing direct influence that this semi-
monopoly provides over the economies of neighboring states. The gas war between Russia and Ukraine in 
January 2009 and its implications for European consumers of Russian gas make clear the importance to 
Moscow of its control of oil and gas exports in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives and its willingness to use 
that leverage.
20
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 President’s speech to the Federal Assembly, April 2005. BBC Monitoring. ‘Putin Focuses on Domestic Policy in State-of-
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Johnson’s Russia List, JRL 2008-#292, 6 November 2008. From Moscow’s perspective, however, its policy goals are not 
revisionist, but rather are intended to reestablish Russia’s legitimate position in the aftermath of the West’s having taken 
advantage of Russian decline in the immediate post-cold war period. 
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 It is important to note that in the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation over gas supplies, as in the Georgian-Russian military 
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Before turning to a more detailed discussion of specific developments in Russian relations with the United 
States in the recent past, it is important to discuss, at least briefly, the relationship between the growing 
assertiveness in Russian foreign policy and domestic political developments. As Russia’s leaders abandoned the 
halting efforts at democratization that characterized the first decade of the Russian Federation and increasingly 
reestablished the institutions and policies of a traditional authoritarian state, they have also seized upon 
economic growth and Russian nationalism as the foundations on which to build support from broad segments of 
the population. The economic boom of the past decade that resulted in more than doubling the gross domestic 
product per capita of the Russian population has been an important element in the popularity of former 
President Putin and in the support for his policies. However, the question arises about the Russian people’s 
willingness to continue to support an essentially authoritarian regime in a period of serious economic downturn, 
such as the one that engulfed Russia at the end of 2008. 
Public opinion polls as well as anecdotal information indicate widespread public support for the return of 
Russia to great power status; more specifically Russians overwhelmingly supported the Kremlin’s decision to 
invade Georgia in August 2008.
21
 Related to this broad sense of nationalism, the Putin-Medvedev leadership 
has increasingly focused on the dangers to Russia presented by foreign enemies, of which the United States is 
virtually always listed first. The most recent version of the Foreign Policy Concept issued by President 
Medvedev in late July 2008, immediately prior to the intervention in Georgia, represents a break with earlier 
versions of the Concept, even though it in effect merely codified changes that had already occurred over recent 
years.
22
 First, unlike the Concept issued at the beginning of the Putin presidency, it focuses on external, rather 
than internal, challenges to Russian security—with U.S. global dominance at the very top of the list. In line with 
the extensive discussion of ‘sovereign democracy’ in Russia, the Concept stipulates that global competition is 
acquiring a civilizational dimension, which suggests competition between different value systems and 
development models within the framework of universal democratic and market economy principles. The new 
Concept maintains that the reaction to the prospect of loss by the historic West of its monopoly in global 
processes finds its expression, in particular, in the continued political and psychological policy of ‘containing’ 
Russia.
23
 The document emphasizes throughout Russia’s independence and sovereignty as the foundation on 
which all of Moscow’s relations with the outside world must be built.  
A resurgent nationalism, integrated with an almost paranoid concern for security,
24
 underlies Moscow’s 
current approach to the outside world. As both Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have repeated on 
numerous occasions, Russia is a major power whose interests have simply been ignored by the West, especially 
a would-be hegemonic Washington. With the return of Russia’s power base—especially in economic terms—
Russia simply will not stand by and permit those interests to be pushed aside. It will not permit itself either to 
become a dependent supporter of U.S. policy initiatives or to be shunted aside into the ‘dustbin of history.’ We 
turn now to an explicit examination of the specifics of the Russian-U.S. relationship as they related to the rise of 
Russia as a major regional actor. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
January 2009. For a perceptive analysis of the Ukrainian-Russian gas war see Heronim Petrovi!, ‘Farce ums Gas: Russland, 
die Ukraine und die EU-Energiepolitik’, Osteurop, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 19-35.  
21
 ‘Half of Russians Yearn for Super-Power Status’; see, also Anne Barnard (2008) ‘Russians Confident That Nation is 
Back,’ The New York Times, 15 August, http://www.nytimes.com.  
22
 ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation: 31.07.2008’, MaximsNews, News Network for the 
United Nations and the International Community, http://www.maximsnews.com/ 
news20080731russiaforeignpolicyconcept10807311601.htm. See also Shlapentokh (2008) ‘Behind the Five-Day 
War’. 
23
 ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation: 31.07.2008.’ 
24
  It is important to recognize that the U.S. decision to pursue a policy of de facto containment of Russia beginning already 
by the mid-1990s, as noted elsewhere in this article, has reinforced Moscow’s concerns for security and for its future role in 
areas adjacent to Russian territory and viewed as crucial to Russia’s long-term interests. 

 11 
PART FOUR 
Russia and the United States since 9/11 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, President Putin offered 
Russia’s support to the United States in its initial response to the attacks. This initiative opened a brief period in 
which relations between the United States and Russia were generally cordial—more cordial than they had been 
in a number of years. The divisions that had characterized the policies of the two countries in the late 1990s 
continued to exist, but were overshadowed by the obvious areas of collaboration between the two countries—
especially in the area of combating terrorist threats. Russia supported the initial U.S. military intervention 
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, in part by facilitating U.S. access to air bases in Central Asia 
that proved to be important in the U.S. pursuit of military operations in Afghanistan. However, by summer and 
fall of 2002, as the Bush Administration pushed for military intervention and regime change in Iraq, the 
relationship rapidly unraveled. In fact, the Russian Federation, along with key U.S. NATO allies France and 
Germany, comprised the core opposition within the UN Security Council to U.S. demands for direct military 
intervention against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. It is from this point that we can track the deterioration of relations 
between Moscow and Washington—a deterioration that by early 2009, at the time of the transfer of presidential 
power from George W. Bush to Barack Obama in Washington, had reached the level of confrontation on a 
variety of issues of central concern to the foreign policy of both countries. These issues concerned, first and 
foremost, the relative standing and role of the two countries in the international system. More specifically, 
however, tensions concerned Russia’s lack of input in key global discussions about future security, the West’s 
political, security, and economic encroachment in areas viewed in Moscow as Russia’s sphere of influence, and 
the West’s position on a whole series of developments. In the following pages we will discuss briefly a number 
of these issues that divide Moscow and Washington and the likelihood of their resolution in the near term. 
U.S. Unilateralism and the Russian Response 
Among the most central and consistent themes in Russian foreign policy in recent years has been the call for the 
reestablishment of a multipolar international political system in which all major powers, including especially 
Russia, have an equal voice. This theme has been a core element in most of the major speeches of Russian 
leaders over the past decade, even prior to the resurgence of Russia as a major international player and the 
decision in Moscow to challenge the United States on a broad array of policy issues. The 2000 version of The 
Russian Foreign Policy Concept, for example, made the point throughout that Russia was committed to a 
multipolar approach to international security and that ‘[t]he strategy of unilateral actions can destabilize the 
international situation, provoke tensions and the arms race, aggravate interstate contradictions, national and 
religious strife.’
25
 In his strongly critical attack of the United States, NATO and the West more broadly, 
presented at an international security conference in Munich in 2007, President Putin noted: ‘The United States 
has overstepped its borders in all spheres—economic, political and humanitarian—and has imposed itself on 
other states. . . . One-sided illegitimate action hasn’t solved a single problem and has become a generator of 
many human tragedies, a source of tension.’
26
 The tone of Moscow’s criticism did not let up after the ‘transfer 
of power’ from Putin to his presidential successor Dmitry Medvedev, as the latter criticized the United States 
for encouraging Georgia’s ‘barbaric aggression’ against South Ossetia in August 2008 and for using the ensuing 
Russia-Georgia war as an excuse further to expand NATO.
27
 
This source of division between the United States and the Russian Federation has been one that is at the 
root of many of the other areas of disagreement for more than a decade and is one that will in the future be 
difficult to resolve. It concerns the very way in which the leaderships of the two countries view themselves and 
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their dealings with the rest of the world. Despite the change in administrations in Washington and the likely 
abandonment of the most egregious elements of a unilateralist and assertive U.S. nationalist foreign policy, U.S. 
decision makers will continue, as they have for more than two centuries, to view the United States as an 
‘exceptional’ state, one destined to provide global leadership.
28
   
Such an approach to dealing with Russia is likely to continue to bring with it problems, for in very many 
respects the Russians have a similar view of themselves as unique masters of their own destiny, completely 
independent actors, and a legitimate global power. This is the message that Putin, Medvedev and other Russian 
leaders have been so insistent in conveying over the course of the past five years, or so. ‘Sovereign democracy’ 
as the theoretical underpinning of the Russian political system is termed, calls for Russian unilateralism in 
foreign and security policy, in so far as that is possible. 
Moscow and the U.S.-EU Challenge to Russia’s Sphere of Influence 
Quite a number of the sources of conflict between Russia and the United States—and the West more 
generally—result from what the Russians view as a deliberate attempt to undermine their country’s legitimate 
interests in regions of special interest to them and the attempt to limit and contain Russia’s revival as a great 
power. This reaction relates to the dramatic shift in the status of the territory between the Russian Federation 
and Western Europe, all of which was until quite recently a part of a Soviet-dominated ‘empire’—either internal 
or external—and most of which is now integrated into Western economic, political and security institutions. 
NATO and EU expansion eastward has been viewed in Moscow as the result of purposeful Western programs 
aimed at expanding the West’s geopolitical dominance in Europe and directly undermining Russia’s role and its 
long-term security. The Russians ignore the fact that the initiative for inclusion came from the Central European 
peoples themselves, and that the West was, in fact, responding to these initiatives. What they see is the dramatic 
change in the geopolitical relationships throughout the region. 
Ever since the most recent expansions of NATO and EU membership into formerly communist Europe, 
relations between Russia and those organizations have deteriorated significantly. In part, this has resulted from 
the much more assertive efforts of Moscow to reestablish its influence in the broader Central and East European 
region—witness the periodic confrontations between the Russian Federation and Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. On the other hand, as Joan DeBardeleben has demonstrated in the case of the 
European Union, the entrance of postcommunist members into the EU has added a significant level of 
complexity to EU-Russian relations, as members such as Poland and the Baltic states have made demands on 
the organization to take a stand on a variety of issues that have challenged Russian policy.
29
 Poland, for 
example, stymied efforts to renegotiate a new EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement for more 
than a year in response to Moscow’s embargo of the importation of Polish meat products, which the Poles 
viewed as politically motivated.
30
   
Some of the new members of the European Union have been strongly critical of bilateral deals negotiated 
with Russia by other EU member states to build new gas pipelines from Russia to Europe that will bypass their 
territory. Once again Poland has been the most vocal in its concerns about the implications of such a pipeline 
for both its interests and for the future development of an EU energy policy.
31
 Among the new challenges to the 
Russian-EU relationship, however, perhaps the most visible have related to the active role that Poland, 
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Lithuania, and other postcommunist states played in supporting political reform in Ukraine, Georgia and even 
Belarus—political reform that has generally been interpreted by Moscow as a challenge to its interests.
32
 During 
and after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in late 2004, which forced new elections and brought to power in 
Kiev Western-oriented leaders, the Polish government was among its most active advocates and supporters in 
Europe.
33
 Postcommunist EU member states also backed developments in Georgia associated with the Rose 
Revolution of 2003 that brought to power in Tbilisi a Western-oriented government.
34
 
We have been focusing on the impact of EU expansion into what the Russians view as their legitimate 
sphere of interest and influence. Although this development obviously does not impinge directly on the 
Russian-American relationship, it has clear implications for it. First of all, there is the fact that all of the new 
member states of the EU also joined NATO since 1998. Moreover, as a group they have generally supported 
U.S. foreign and security policy—for example, politically in the run up to the Iraq War and militarily in 
contributing to the U.S.-led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. When former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld divided U.S. allies into ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, the majority of those favorably included in the latter 
group were the postcommunist states of Central Europe. The position of these countries in backing the United 
States is quite understandable given the history of the second half of the twentieth century and the concern that 
some of these governments have had about the impact that the revival of a strong Russia might have for their 
future security.
35
 It is always important to recall that, contrary to Moscow’s picture of an aggressive United 
States and/or Western Europe attempting to take advantage of Russia’s weakness during the 1990s and pushing 
eastward to contain the revival of Russian influence, the countries of the region vigorously pursued membership 
in both NATO and the EU as part of their ‘return to Europe’ and, one must recognize, their escape from Russia.   
The most recent illustrations of Russia’s reactions to what is viewed as challenges to Russian honor or 
Western incursions into legitimate Russian spheres of influence have been the so-called cyber-war conducted 
against Estonia in 2007,
36
 the mounting pressures against Georgia that culminated in military intervention in 
August 2008 and the ensuing diplomatic recognition of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
and the gas war with Ukraine in January 2009. All three of these developments were more complex than this 
simple listing implies. But the element that ties them together is the attempt by an increasingly assertive Russia 
to make clear to its near neighbors that on issues on which Moscow has a strong position, it is willing to use the 
capabilities at its command—capabilities that have increased over the past decade—in order to accomplish its 
goals. Whether the matter concerns what the Russians view as dishonor to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War 
and an interpretation of the ‘liberation’ from Nazi domination seen as demeaning to Russia, as in the case of 
Estonia, or the growing friction between Georgia and Russia ever since the shift in Tbilisi to a government 
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committed to establishing greater distance from Moscow and closer ties with, even integration into, Western 
institutions, the leaders in Moscow will no longer stand back and watch Western influence increase. In the case 
of both Ukraine and Georgia the added factor of Washington’s pushing for admission of the two states into 
NATO in spring 2008 no doubt played a role in the Russian decision to forestall such a development.
37
 
From Moscow’s perspective U.S. actions in Central Asia in conjunction with the Russian-backed expansion 
of military involvement after 9/11 as part of the war on terror also raised concerns about U.S. meddling in an 
area of special Russian interest. Yet, the expulsion of the Americans from Uzbekistan in 2005 and the ensuing 
solidification of Russian relations with most of the countries of the region have largely removed the United 
States as a competitor for influence in Central Asia.
38
 But from Moscow’s perspective the issue of the U.S. role 
in undermining Russian influence in neighboring states and facilitating, even encouraging, their entrance into 
Western institutions, especially NATO, remains a serious impediment to improved Russian-U.S. relations. 
Russian Charges of a U.S. Military Threat 
Distinct from, but closely related to, the matter of U.S. and Western challenges to Russia’s sphere of influence 
as discussed in the prior section of this essay is the stated Russian concern that the United States and NATO 
represent a serious threat to Russian security. Putin and Medvedev have both asserted that the NATO alliance’s 
placement of forces in countries immediately along Russia’s borders undermines the level of mutual trust and, 
thus, requires Russia to respond in like fashion.
39
 The Bush Administration’s decision to go ahead with the 
development and placement of the first stage of an anti-missile defense system in the Czech Republic and 
Poland and the decisions of the two Central European countries to finalize the agreements despite Russian 
opposition provide clear evidence of the serious divisions in Russian relations with the United States, but also of 
the nature of Moscow’s relations with its former client states. Washington has simply not taken seriously 
Russian leaders’ regular assertions that they view the placement of an anti-missile system, even one as modest 
in size as that currently planned, as a challenge to their own long-term security. Nor have the Russians accepted 
Washington’s arguments that the system is meant solely and exclusively as possible protection against rogue 
states—read Iran—that might develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the speed with which the Poles and 
Czechs finally ratified the agreements with the United States in August 2008—after long domestic debates—
made clear that the Russian military intervention in Georgia and revived concerns about the long-term nature of 
their relations with Russia played a major role in their decisions.
40
 No doubt President Medvedev’s address to 
the Russian Parliament on 5 November 2008 reinforced concerns throughout Central Europe, as he announced 
the likely deployment of Russian missiles in the Kaliningrad Region along the Polish border and that 
capabilities for electronic warfare against NATO would be expanded in the area.
41
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Thus, the issues of NATO expansion and the absorption of additional former Soviet republics, as well as 
the introduction of U.S. anti-missile defenses into Central Europe, appear to be non-starters in terms of their 
impact on the possibility of a normalization of Russian relations with the United States. Only a complete change 
in the way that the Russians view these issues, or a U.S. decision that the cost involved in continuing to pursue 
them is too high, is likely to remove them as serious hindrances to improved relations. There is some evidence 
that the new Obama administration is not committed either to developing a missile defense shield or to further 
NATO expansion, but this is a matter that will only become clear with the passage of time. 
Russian Gas and Oil Exports and U.S. Efforts at Economic Containment 
Already in the mid-1990s, as part of an overall approach toward Russia that had much in common with a 
strategy of containment, the United States began to advocate the development of oil and gas pipelines to 
Western Europe that would skirt Russian territory and, thus, reduce the potential of Russia’s gaining further 
leverage over either Central Asian exporters or the Western purchasers of energy.
42
 During the past decade, as 
Moscow began to use the supply of gas and oil to neighboring states as an explicit foreign policy tool,
43
 
Washington became even more concerned about Western energy dependence on Russia and renewed its role in 
encouraging the development of alternative routes for the delivery of energy, especially natural gas, from the 
new fields in Central Asia to the West. The Russians, understandably, have viewed this U.S. initiative—
especially in conjunction with the expansion of NATO eastward—as a continuation of a policy of containment.   
U.S. efforts since the 1990s to contain Russian influence over the delivery of energy to Europe have failed 
to accomplish their objectives; Russia has effectively outmaneuvered the United States in its relations with the 
oil and gas producing countries of Central Asia. Although several pipelines have been completed that avoid 
Russian territory, Moscow has been successful in recent years in reestablishing solid political and economic 
relations with the authoritarian regimes of Central Asia. They have signed new agreements with Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and other major energy producers that will result in expanded supplies of gas and oil destined for 
European consumers through the existing and planned pipeline network that crosses Russian territory.
44
 At the 
time of the Russian intervention in Georgia Moscow signed new agreements with Central Asian producers for 
the expansion of their gas exports through Russia, rather than via southern pipelines favored by the United 
States.
45
 This is all part of a Russian effort to increase control over the flow of oil and gas to Europe as a 
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prelude to being in a position to influence, indirectly at least, the political orientation of key European 
governments on issues such as the status of secessionist regions of Moldova and Georgia, Russian policy in 
Chechnya, etc.
46
 
Russia and important Western partners have also put into place plans for the future distribution of oil and 
gas to Europe that will greatly reduce the possible interference of current transit states such as Ukraine and 
Belarus, as well as Poland, by avoiding those transit states altogether. The so-called gas war between Russia and 
Ukraine in January 2009 provides probably the best evidence, from a Russian perspective, that it has to reduce 
this dependence.
47
 The planned Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea directly from Russia to the coast of 
Germany,
48
 as well as the more recently announced South Stream pipeline that will run under the Black Sea 
from Russia directly to Bulgaria, will expand Russia’s domination over the gas markets of Europe, while 
reducing the possibility of countries such as Ukraine, Belarus or Poland disrupting those flows.
49
 Overall, 
Russia has positioned itself effectively to control the production and distribution of energy across almost the 
entirety of former Soviet space and, thus, to Europe as well, as part of former President Putin’s commitment to 
establish Russia as a major global actor. The dependence on external sources for virtually all gas and oil needs 
of some countries in the European Union and their willingness to cut bilateral deals with Russia outside the 
context of a common EU policy (notably Germany), has greatly aided Russia in its attempt to employ energy as 
a foreign policy tool. It has also contributed to the divisions within the European Union and between the United 
States and key EU member states on the issue of the future of EU energy policy. However, the impact of the 
January 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas war has, at least for the time being, influenced European states to 
reconsider the implications of their dependence on Russia for energy.
50
 
Other Outstanding Disagreements 
In addition to the issues discussed here a long list of other serious policy disagreements divided Moscow and 
Washington as the new Obama Administration took control of U.S. foreign policy. These include a number of 
outstanding territorial issues such as Russia’s refusal to recognize the Western-supported independent state of 
Kosovo, but also Russia’s recognition—in part, in retaliation—of the independence of the Georgian breakaway 
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and subsequent virtual incorporation of the two into the Russian 
Federation. In both of these cases the United States and Russia have taken opposed positions. But this issue, as 
we have already noted earlier, is part of the much broader concern of Russian and U.S. policy toward those 
states in Eastern Europe that have declared that it is their intention to join NATO and the European Union. The 
status of both Russian-Georgian and Russian-Ukrainian relations and the impact of their conflicts on Moscow’s 
policy toward Washington remain toward the top of the list of priorities. 
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Just as important, however, is the divergence between Moscow’s and Washington’s assessments to date on 
carrying out the ‘war on terror’, to use former President Bush’s phrase. Although the matter of U.S. policy in 
Iraq no longer dominates bilateral relations as it did immediately prior to and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the 
two countries continue to differ seriously on this issue. The matter of Russian treatment of the former 
breakaway republic of Chechnya has also been an issue of some importance, since the United States—as well as 
the European Union—has periodically condemned the Russians for their brutal treatment of both insurgents and 
the population at large. But the manner in which the United States has conducted its ‘war on terror’ without real 
input or consultation with other states, including especially Russia, has contributed to the friction between the 
two states. 
Over the past several years the Russians have also pursued a very visible policy of establishing closer ties 
with states openly critical, even hostile, to the United States and to U.S. interests. This includes the expansion of 
economic ties with Cuba and Venezuela, accompanied by showy collaborative military exercises,
51
 as well as 
vetoes of Western efforts in the United Nations to expand pressures on the murderous regime in Zimbabwe and 
to bring a halt to the ethnic cleansing in Sudan.
52
  
Finally, Moscow has begun to ‘show the flag’ far from Russian territory, as illustrated by its collaborative 
military operations with the Venezuelans and the recent flexing of its military muscles with the resumption, 
after more than fifteen years, of naval and air patrols off the northern coasts of Scandinavia and the planting of 
the Russian flag at the bottom of the Arctic.
53
 These activities, along with the regular very critical attacks on the 
United States and on U.S. policy, appear to have several purposes. First, to reaffirm the position that Russia is 
an independent and an important world actor that can and will pursue its own interests, and, second, to build—
or rebuild—a set of relationships with states that share Russia’s opposition to Washington’s policies and will 
support it in various international venues. 
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PART FIVE 
A Possible Future Scenario 
 
Where is this relationship likely to go in the near term? Analysts agree that for both countries an improvement 
is important, if they are going to be able to deal with issues of importance to each of their national interests. 
First and foremost, the issues of international terrorism and the challenges from militant Islam are matters of 
concern to both governments, and cooperation in dealing with them remains important. In fact, despite the 
serious deterioration in relations in recent years and the heightened hostile rhetoric, collaboration in this area, in 
particular concerning military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, has continued. The 
solution of other matters of mutual interest to Moscow and Washington, such as the possible development of 
nuclear weapons by Iran,
54
 an important issue on which the two countries have not agreed, are likely possible 
only with an improvement in bilateral relations and a less confrontational approach than that which we have 
witnessed in recent years. In some respects Russian-U.S. relations in recent years have followed a path 
described best by the cycle of escalation described as a ‘security dilemma.’ After each decision by one side or 
the other to pursue a particular policy—whether the U.S. decision to begin building a protective missile shield 
or the Russian decision to ‘solve’ its problems with Georgia by military intervention—the level of mutual 
hostility rose and led to a retaliatory action on the part of the other side. 
Although most of the issues that divide the two sides are matters viewed as serious and central to 
interpretations of national interest and, thus, not easy to resolve, the election of a new U.S. president who has 
indicated a commitment to implementing a new approach to relations with the rest of the world provides 
opportunity for a new start in Russian-U.S. relations. In fact, after closed discussions on 26 January 2009, the 
Russian ambassador to NATO implied that Russia and NATO were in the process of regularizing relations 
suspended in the wake of the Russia-Georgia war of summer 2008.
55
 This information, added to the 
announcement that Russia will not deploy Iskander missiles targeted on U.S. facilities in Poland and/or the 
Czech Republic,
56
 and considered within the context of a possible new orientation in U.S. foreign policy under 
President Obama, raises hope of possible improvement in relations between the two countries. In an interview 
with the Italian press in early February 2009 former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who spoke by 
telephone recently with President Obama and was at a meeting with President Medvedev, said there are grounds 
to be optimistic about relations between Russia and the United States.
57
  
Issues in the Russian-U.S. relationship that must be handled almost immediately concern, in particular, 
arms control—a matter largely ignored during the entire Bush administration. For example, the Bush 
Administration decided to let the START treaty of 1994, which monitored and limited a variety of nuclear 
weapons, simply expire in 2009 rather than negotiating a renewal or an extension of the agreement.
58
 This 
decision, plus the call for the updating of U.S. nuclear weapons by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, among 
others, led the Russians to declare that the United States was engaged in a ‘drive for strategic domination.’
59
 
                                                           
54
 See Rose Gottemoeller (2008) ‘U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Iran: Aftermath of the Summer War in Georgia’, Pro and 
Contra, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July-August, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/ 
index.cfm?fa=view&id=22449&prog=zru (accessed 1 February 2009).  
55
 Warren Mass (2009) ‘The Expanding War in Afghanistan,’ New American, 28 January, http://www.thenewamerican.com/ 
world-mainmenu-26/asia-mainmenu-33/735 (accessed 1 February 2009); ‘Russia Welcomes NATO’s Willingness to resume 
Cooperation’, RIA Novosti, 5 March 2009, http://en.rian.ru/world/20090305/120443337.html (accessed 13 March 2009); and 
Roger McDermott (2009) ‘Russia, NATO, and the “Obama Factor”,’ Asia Times online, 31 January, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KA31Ag01.html (accessed 1 February 2009).  
56
 ‘Russia Ready not to aim Iskander Missile Systems against USA’.  
57
 ‘Grounds for optimism over Russia-U.S. ties—Gorbachev’ (2009) RIA Novosti, 2 February, http://en.rian.ru/russia/ 
20090202/119925467.html (accessed 2 February 2009). See also Olga Pavlikova (2009) ‘Vladimir Putin Appreciated 
Barack Obama’s Stand’ (2009) Gazeta, 27 January; translated in Johnson’s Russia List, JRL 2009-#1827, January 2009.  
58
 Wade Boese (2008) ‘START Decision Put Off to 2009’, Arms Control Association, December, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/START (accessed 2 February 2009).  
59
 Yuri Baluyevski, former chief of the Russian general staff, cited in Stephen Sestanovich (2008) ‘What Has Moscow 
Done: Rethinking U.S.-Russian Relations,’ Foreign Affairs, 27, 6, p. 18. In response to plans announced during the Bush 
Administration by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to develop a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons to replace aging 
20 Roger E. Kanet 
 
President Obama has made clear that he does not support the development of a new generation of nuclear 
weapons, despite the views of his Defense Secretary.
60
 This set of developments may set the stage for the 
countries to negotiate an extension of the START treaty rather than pursue a costly and potentially dangerous 
nuclear arms race.  
The new tone promised in American foreign policy is likely to improve the environment in which Russian-
U.S. interactions occur—at least at the rhetorical level.
61
 Moreover, there exists a substantial area of 
overlapping interests between the Russian Federation and the United States relating to other aspects of arms 
control, international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and now the global economic slowdown. 
However, there is one set of issues where U.S. and broader Western compromise would appear to be 
impossible, without their abandoning principle. Russia cannot be permitted to veto the continuation of the 
development of close ties between former Soviet republics and clients with the West. The rush to membership 
in the EU and NATO that began with the collapse of the external and internal Soviet empires two decades ago 
was not orchestrated in Washington or Brussels, but rather in the countries which had just escaped half a 
century, or more, of Soviet domination.   
Whether Moscow’s new-found assertiveness in its relations with its near neighbors will undercut prospects 
for improved relations will depend almost entirely on Moscow’s flexibility in dealing with these countries as 
sovereign equals and not as a part of a revitalized ‘Greater Russia.’
62
 What is clear is that the areas of mutual 
interest exist between Moscow and Washington where both sides could benefit by renewed cooperation, that the 
new administration in Washington seems willing to back off from some of its predecessor’s policy initiatives 
deemed most unacceptable in Moscow, and that some in Moscow seem willing at least to test a possible return 
to a less assertive approach to the Russian-U.S. relationship.
63
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